\u3cem\u3eCommissioner v. Soliman\u3c/em\u3e: A Man\u27s Home May Be His Castle But Not His Principal Place of Business by Slenn, Brad
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Business Law Review
4-1-1994
Commissioner v. Soliman: A Man's Home May Be
His Castle But Not His Principal Place of Business
Brad Slenn
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Business Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation





A MAN'S HOME MAY BE HIS CASTLE BUT NOT HIS
PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS
The Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) differentiates between business
expenses and personal or living expenses. Business expenses are deduct-
ible from income while personal expenses are not. These themes clash,
however, when business is conducted within the home. Expenses incurred
in the upkeep of a taxpayer's residence are for personal and living use, yet
some specific expenses may be directly or indirectly attributable to an in-
come-producing business.
Prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, business ex-
pense deductions for the home office were handled within the confines of
I.R.C. § 162(a), which allowed a deduction of ordinary and necessary
business expenses;' I.R.C. § 212, which allowed a deduction of expenses
incurred for the production of income;' and I.R.C. § 262, which denied
deductibility of personal, living or family expenses.3 Congress could disal-
low any other deductions it chose to as "a matter of grace."4 Because dis-
tinguishing between business expenses and personal expenses is fairly dif-
ficult, the taxpayer might possibly receive an undeserving deduction.
To ease the tensions between § 162 and § 262, Congress enacted §
I.R.C. § 162(a).
In General. -There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expens-
es paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business.
I.R.C. § 162(a) (1975).
2 I.R.C. § 212.
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and nec-
essary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year-
(1) for the production or collection of income;
(2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the
production of income: or...
I.R.C. § 212 (1975).
3 I.R.C. § 262(a).
General Rule. - Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, no deduction shall be al-
lowed for personal, living, or family expenses.
I.R.C. § 262(a) (1975).
4 Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958).
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280A as a compromise, which disallowed any deduction for use of a home
which is used as a residence.' Section 280A(c)(1), however, provided
exceptions allowing home office deductions for certain business use. A
taxpayer can deduct home office expenses so long as the office is exclu-
sively and regularly used as the principal place of business, to meet cli-
ents, customers or patients, or in connection with the taxpayer's business
if the office is not attached to the home.6 Unfortunately, neither the stat-
ute nor the caselaw regarding the exceptions has laid to rest the question
of home office deductibility in determining taxable income.
There exists a need for clarity between nondeductible personal expens-
es and specific business expenses with regards to the maintenance of a
home office as a result of shifting work patterns in today's economy. The
home office may become increasingly popular as an opportunity for one
spouse to stay at home with children in two income households. The
emergence of an information super highway will provide easier access to
business information, thereby enabling the taxpayer to conduct more busi-
ness at home. The expansion of global markets has made business an
around-the-clock venture, no longer forcing the taxpayer to be constricted
to those working hours held by the traditional office. This increased em-
phasis and use of the home office means there is a greater need to recon-
cile and delineate those functions which enable a home office to obtain a
tax deduction.
5 I.R.C. § 280A(a).
General Rule. - Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the case of a taxpayer
who is an individual or an S corporation, no deduction otherwise allowable under this chap-
ter shall be allowed with respect to the use of a dwelling unit which is used by the taxpayer
during the taxable year as a residence.
I.R.C. § 280A(a) (1975).
6 I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1).
(1) CERTAIN BUSINESS USE.-Subsection (a) shall not apply to any item to the extent
such item is allocable to a portion of the dwelling unit which is exclusively used on a regu-
lar basis-
(A) [as] the principal place of business for any trade or business of the taxpayer,
(B) as a place of business which is used by patients, clients, or customers in
meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of his trade or busi-
ness, or
(C) in the case of a separate structure which is not attached to the dwelling unit,
in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business.
In the case of an employee, the preceding sentence shall apply only if the exclusive use referred to in
the preceding sentence is for the convenience of his employer.
I.R.C. § 280A(c)(l) (1994).
COMMISSIONER V. SOLIMAN
This Note will examine the principal place of business exception con-
tained in § 280A(c). Section one will discuss the "appropriate and helpful"
test used by the Tax Court prior to the enactment of § 280A, and the
adoption of § 280A to resolve conflicts among the courts and to curb tax-
payer abuse. Section two will focus on the "focal point" test as previously
applied to determine the principal place of business under § 280A(c)(1).
Next, section three reviews the development of the "dominant portion"
tests adopted by the Second and Seventh Circuits in response to inequities
caused by using the "focal point" test. Section four examines the "facts
and circumstances" test used by the Tax Court in Soliman v. Commission-
er' in response to the three appellate court reversals of the "focal point"
test. Section five discusses and analyzes the resulting Supreme Court deci-
sion and § 280A(c)(1). Section six addresses the reasoning of those Justic-
es who criticized the decision and explores the tests put forth by Justice
Thomas in his concurrence and Justice Stevens in his dissent. Finally, sec-
tion seven considers the implications of, and the regulatory response to,
the Supreme Court decision, Tax Court cases, and Revenue Rulings which
modify the notion of the principle place of business in accordance with
Soliman. Further, section seven addresses the newly proposed legislation
drafted to counteract the impact of Soliman.
. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THE "APPROPRIATE AND
HELPFUL" TEST
Before the enactment of § 280A, Congress had provided little guid-
ance with regard to home office deductions. In order to receive a deduc-
tion for the business use of a personal residence, a taxpayer had to estab-
lish that such expenses were incurred through carrying on a business (§
162) or for the production of income (§ 212).' The business activity must
have been directly connected to the use of the home. Under I.R.C. Regula-
tion § 1.262-1(b)(3), any expenses incurred in maintaining the home were
considered nondeductible living expenses, even when a taxpayer inciden-
94 T.C. 20 (1990), affd, 935 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S.Ct. 701 (1993). The
United States Tax Court has applied Soliman in both Shore v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1990-272
(1990) (applying the "essential to his business," and "no other location available to perform the office
functions of the business" tests), and McDonald v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1991-54 (1991) (evalu-
ating the "all of the facts and circumstances" test).
B S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439,
3576.
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tally conducted business there.9 This Regulation allowed a business ex-
pense deduction for a part of the home only if that part was used as the
taxpayer's sole place of business.'
The Internal Revenue Service maintained a rigid standard on the de-
ductibility of a home office. Its opinion was that a home office was more
closely related to a personal expense under § 262, thereby resulting in it
not being deductible. With regard to an office in an employee's home, the
I.R.S. took the position that the office must have been both required by
the employer as a condition of employment, and regularly used by the em-
ployee to perform his or her duties." Any incidental, occasional or vol-
untary uses of the home for business purposes were not deductible. 2
The Tax Court traditionally applied a less restrictive standard than the
Internal Revenue Service. 3 The court's approach, however, was some-
what inconsistent. 4 Generally, the courts took the position that § 162(a)
9 § 1.262-1 provides in part:
(b) Personal, living, and family expenses are illustrated in the following examples:
(3) Expenses of maintaining a household, including amounts paid for rent, water,
utilities, domestic service, and the like, are not deductible. A taxpayer who rents
a property for residential purposes, but incidentally conducts business there (his
place of business being elsewhere) shall not deduct any part of the rent. If, how-
ever, he uses part of the house as his place of business, such portion of the rent
and other similar expenses as is properly attributable to such place of business is
deductible as a business expense.
26 C.F.R. § 1.262-1 (1993).
10 § 1.262-1, supra note 9.
I Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 C.B. 52, 53. The burden of proof rests upon the taxpayer to es-
tablish:
(1) that, as a condition of his employment, he is required to provide his own space and fa-
cilities for performance of some of his duties,
(2) that he regularly uses a part of his personal residence for that purpose,
(3) the portion of his personal residence which is so used,
(4) the extent of such use, and
(5) the pro rata portion of the depreciation and expenses for maintaining his residence
which is properly attributable to such use.
12 Rev. Rul. 62-180, supra note 11.
13 See, e.g., Newi v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 686, 691 (1969), aft'd, 432 F.2d 998,
1000 (2d Cir. 1970) (allowing the deduction where the home office was appropriate and helpful to the
taxpayer's business, even though it was not required by his employer), and Peiss v. Commissioner, 40
T.C. 78, 84 (1963), acq., 1968-2 C.B. 2 (allowing a home office deduction even though the taxpayer's
employer did not require him to maintain the home office).
14 Compare Newi v. Commissioner and Peiss v. Commissioner with Sharon v. Commissioner,
66 T.C. 515, 524 (1976). aftfd, 591 F.2d 1273, 1274 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941
COMMISSIONER V. SOLIMAN
allowed a deduction when the taxpayer's home office expenditure was "or-
dinary and necessary."' 5 The court interpreted "ordinary and necessary"
to mean "appropriate and helpful" in Newi v. Commissioner."6 Thus, the
applicable test for determining the deductibility of home office expenses
was whether, like any other business expense, the maintenance of an of-
fice in the home was appropriate and helpful to running the business under
all circumstances. 7
In Newi v. Commissioner, the taxpayer, Newi, sold television adver-
tisement time for ABC.' He worked out of his home office an average
of three hours per night reviewing and preparing work, researching ratings
material and viewing advertising spots televised on both ABC and compet-
ing networks. 9 He also had an office available to him at the ABC build-
ing. 20
The Tax Court held that the taxpayer's use of his home study was ap-
propriate and helpful to his ability to conduct business, and therefore, the
expenses relating to the study were deductible, ordinary and necessary
business expenses. 2' The appellate court, citing I.R.C. Regulation §
1.262-1(b)(3) of the 1954 Code, contended that so long as the taxpayer
used part of the home as his place of business, the portion of the rent and
expenses that could be attributed to that space acting as the place of busi-
ness was deductible as a business expense.22 It went on to state that the
term "necessary" imposed only the minimal requirement that the contested
expenditure be "appropriate and helpful" to the taxpayer's business.23
(1979) (where the Tax Court considered all the facts and not the appropriate and helpful standard in
denying the home office deduction).
For additional analysis of the positions of different courts on the deductibility of a home office
and the tests used leading up to the enactment of § 280A, see Bryna Lee Rosen, Note, The Home Of-
fice Deduction Game: Will Soliman v. Commissioner Return The Taxpayer To Square One?, 12 Va.
Tax Rev. 141, 144-48 (1992).
15 Sharon, 66 T.C. at 524.
16 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970).
17 See, e.g., Meiers v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1986); Bodzin v. Commission-
er, 60 T.C. 820 (1973), rev'd, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
Is Newi, 432 F.2d at 999.
19 Id.
2 Id. While he did have an office available, it was only available in the evening after regular
business hours. Id.
21 Newi v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 686, 691 (1969), affid, 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir.
1970).
2 Newi, 432 F.2d at 1000.
23 Id.; see also Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966) (quoting Welch v.
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The problem posed by the "appropriate and helpful" standard was that
it enabled taxpayers to attribute personal living and family expenses to the
home office as ordinary and necessary business expenses.24 This could
allow them to deduct almost any personal or "minor, incremental expense"
that was incurred by, or related to, their business activities.' The court
determination of which expenses were appropriate and helpful to a busi-
ness was necessarily a subjective one.26 Such a determination could result
in the abuse of § 162(a) by the conversion of nondeductible personal,
living and family expenses into deductible ordinary and necessary business
expenses, should such expenses be appropriate and helpful in carrying on
business activities within the residence.27 Congress wanted to prevent this
unwarranted deduction of business expenses for what was essentially per-
sonal use, and permit a deduction for only legitimate business use of the
home.2" There also was concern that the appropriate and helpful test in-
creased the administrative burden of the taxpayer by requiring him to cal-
culate the amount of time used for business in the use of his personal resi-
dence.29
Congress, therefore, felt the need to provide more definitive rules re-
garding home office business deductions in order to resolve conflicts be-
tween court decisions and the position of the Internal Revenue Service.3"
It also sought to prevent possible deductions of nondeductible personal,
living and family expenses due to minor, incremental business expenses
incurred in relation to the maintenance of a business office in the home.3'
Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933)).
2 S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439,
3579-3580.
25 Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing S. Rep. 938, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 174, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3580).
2 S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976). reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439,
3579-3580.
n Baie v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 105, 110 (1980); S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3579.
n Soliman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 20, 24 (1990); S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439.
Baie, 74 T.C. at 109; S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3579.
30 Compare Bodzin v. Commissioner, 509 F.2d 679, 681 (4th Cir. 1975) (where the appellate
court, in reversing the tax court, did not consider the appropriate and helpful standard in denying the
deduction), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975) with Newi v. Commissioner, 432 F.2d 998, 1000 (2d
Cir. 1970) (where the appellate court affirmed the tax court and used the appropriate and helpful stan-
dard in allowing the deduction).
31 See Baie, 74 T.C. at 109; Drucker, 715 F.2d at 69; S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
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The appropriate and helpful standard made it too easy for taxpayers to
assess personal expenses as ordinary and necessary business expenses war-
ranting a deduction. Thus, in response to conflicting results and tensions
between § 162 and § 262, Congress enacted § 280A into the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 to disallow home office deductions unless one of three nar-
row exceptions were met.32 Unfortunately, § 280A did not provide the
definitive rules that Congress had intended. The statute itself provided no
definition for the taxpayer's principle place of business. Nor was there
guidance in the legislative history or the regulations as to what constituted
the principle place of business within the context of § 280A. Thus, the
new statutory language both required and invited judicial interpretation.
The Tax Court envisioned that Congress had meant to rely on the fo-
cal point of the taxpayers activities.33 Because Congress did not provide
more precise language, the Tax Court developed and adopted a "focal
point" test to identify a taxpayer's principal place of business.'
II. THE PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS AND THE FOCAL
POINT TEST
The focal point test was defined in Baie v. Commissioner as the place
where goods or services are provided to customers or clients, or where in-
come is produced.35 The number of hours spent conducting different ac-
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3579.
32 I.R.C. §280A(c)(1).
(1)-Subsection (a) shall not apply to any item to the extent such item is allocable to a por-
tion of the dwelling unit which is exclusively used on a regular basis-
(A) [as] the principal place of business for any trade or business of the taxpayer,
(B) as a place of business which is used by patients, clients, or customers in
meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of his trade or busi-
ness, or
(C) in the case of a separate structure which is not attached to the dwelling unit,
in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business.
In the case of an employee, the preceding sentence shall apply only if the exclusive use referred
to in the preceding sentence is for the convenience of his employer. Baie, 74 T.C. at 105; S. Res. 455,
94th Cong., 2d Sess., 90 Stat. 1520 (1976); S. Con. Rep. No. 1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4118, 4144.
33 Baie, 74 T.C. at 109.
34 Id. at 105.
35 Id. at 110; see Soliman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 20, 25 (1990); Drucker v. Commissioner,
79 T.C. 605, 613 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983); Meiers v. Commission-
er, 782 F.2d 75, 78 (7th Cir. 1986).
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tivities in different locations was not considered controlling in the deter-
mination of the focal point.' Mrs. Baie operated a hot dog stand at
which she packaged and distributed food. When she had no room to ex-
pand the business, she began to prepare the food in her kitchen but contin-
ued to use the kitchen for her personal purposes. She also maintained a
room in her home, which she used exclusively for the administration of
the business.
The Tax Court denied the deduction where the sale of the taxpayer's
product which generated all of the income took place only at the stand.37
The final packaging of the goods for consumption and ultimate sales oc-
curred on the business premises and not at the taxpayer's residence.38
Further, the room in the house, used exclusively for the bookkeeping of
the business, did not constitute the focal point of the business.39 Even
though she may have spent a good amount of time there performing nec-
essary business tasks, the room produced no income nor was it used to
render services to customers.
The Tax Court consistently followed the focal point test as laid out in
Baie until a number of appellate courts questioned its reliability.' Certain
occupations, such as teaching and music, were considered distinguishable
enough in their need and use of a home office to deserve the deduction
even though the office did not qualify as the focal point of the business.4'
36 See Green v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 428, 433 (1982), (where Mr. Green spent a substantial
amount of time returning telephone calls in his home office, the Tax Court relied on what types of
activities were performed and not the number of hours spent at each location to determine the princi-
pal place of business) rev'd, 707 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983); Jackson v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 696, 700
(1981) (although Ms. Jackson, a real estate salesperson, often met with clients at her home office, the
Tax Court denied the deduction where her first contact with clients took place elsewhere).
37 Bale, 74 T.C. at 109.
Id. at I10.
Id.
4 See Green v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 428 (1982), rev'd, 707 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983); Jack-
son v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 696 (1981).
"1 See, e.g., Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983) (where the court, in finding
a musician's occupation a rare situation, allowed a deduction for the home office in which he only
practiced); Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984) (where the court looked to where
the dominant portion of the taxpayer's work was performed in allowing a deduction).
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III. EROSION OF THE FOCAL POINT TEST
The focal point test came under attack by both the Second and Sev-
enth Circuits in three cases in which the appellate courts began to shift
away from the rigid requirements of defining the focal point as the place
where goods or services are provided or income produced.42 In Drucker
v. Commissioner,"' the Tax Court denied a deduction to a musician who
was employed at Lincoln Center, but spent the majority of his time prac-
ticing in a home studio. Although Lincoln Center required him to practice
as a condition of employment, it provided no quiet place in which to do
SO.
The Second Circuit reversed, noting that in the time, importance and
the unusualness factors of the occupation, the musician's practice time at
home was the "focal point" of his employment activities, as opposed to
Lincoln Center performances.' Without the practice, he would not be ca-
pable of performing. He spent less than one-half of his working time at
Lincoln Center.45 Because he used the office exclusively for business and
on a regular basis, the court allowed the deduction. The Drucker court
began to undermine the definition of the focal point test by expanding its
examination of the principal place of business to include the nature of the
taxpayers business activities, the type of space required to conduct such
activities and the practical necessity of using a home office to perform
those activities.
The Second Circuit followed the Drucker decision with Weissman v.
Commissioner," further solidifying its movement away from the tradi-
tional focal point test. Weissman, a college professor, was required by his
employer to research and write scholarly works in addition to teaching,
meeting with students and grading papers.47 He regularly spent eighty
percent of his time researching and Writing exclusively at home.48 The
college made an office available to him on campus. The office, however,
was not a safe place in which to leave books or research, nor did it offer
42 See Meiers v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1986); Weissman v. Commissioner, 751
F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984); Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983).
43 79 T.C. 605 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983).
Drucker, 715 F.2d at 69.
43 id.
4 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 520 (1983), revd, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984).
47 Weissman, 751 F.2d at 514-15.
48 Id.
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the privacy which would allow him to read, think or write without inter-
ruption.49 Weissman felt it a practical necessity to work out of his home
because of the lack of a private, on-campus office."
The court adopted the home office as the principal place of business
by determining where the dominant portion of Professor Weissman's work
was performed. It considered the amount of time spent conducting re-
search and writing at the home office, as well as the fact that such activi-
ties were a condition of employment."' In allowing the deduction, the
Appellate Court noted that not only was the home office the place where
Professor Weissman did the most work, but the lack of a suitable office
on campus made the home office necessary. 2
Like in Drucker, the taxpayer's occupation involved two different but
related activities, teaching as opposed to researching and writing. The
court was concerned that "the 'focal point' approach create[d] a risk of
shifting attention to the place where a taxpayer's work [was] more visible,
instead of the place where the dominant portion of his work [was] accom-
plished. 53 The court backed the decision by pointing out that it espoused
a standard similar to those set forth in the Proposed Regulations of § 280A.'
49 Id.
so Id.
51 Id. at 514; see also Michael M. Megaard & Susan L. Megaard, Supreme Court Narrows
Home Office Deductions in Soliman, 78 J. Tax'n., Mar. 1993, at 132, 133 [hereinafter, Megaard &
Megaardl.
s2 Weissman, 751 F.2d at 514-15.
3 Id.
54 Id. at 515. Section 1.280A-2(b)(3), which addresses the determination of the principal place
of business, states:
When a taxpayer engages in a single trade or business at more than one location, it is nec-
essary to determine the taxpayer's principal place of business for that trade or business in
light of all the facts and circumstances. Among the facts and circumstances to be taken into
account in making this determination are the following:
(i) The portion of the total income from the business which is attributable to
activities at each location;
(ii) The amount of time spent in activities related to that business at each loca-
tion; and
(iii) The facilities available to the taxpayer at each location for purposes of that
business.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2, 45 Fed. Reg. 52,399 (Aug. 7, 1980) (as amended, 48 Fed. Reg. 33,320
(July 21, 1983)).
For example, if an outside salesperson has no office space except at home and spends a substan-
tial amount of time on paperwork at home, the office in the home may qualify as the salesperson's
principal place of business.
The court could have just as easily concluded that, because the employers of Drucker and
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The Seventh Circuit adopted a similar standard in Meiers v. Commis-
sioner." Mrs. Meiers owned and operated a laundromat. Her duties were
to draft employee work schedules, collect money from the machines, fill
the coin changer, help customers, and perform bookkeeping and manageri-
al chores. She spent only one hour a day at the laundromat and two hours
a day at her home office which was set aside exclusively for business
use.
56
The Tax Court denied the deduction under the focal point test. It held
that the laundromat was the location where goods were provided to cus-
tomers and where the income was generated.5 The Appellate Court dis-
agreed, however, and based its reversal on where the work was predomi-
nantly performed. In terms of both the time spent and functions per-
formed, the home office, not the laundromat, was Meiers' principal place
of business. 8 The court was concerned that although the focal point test
was less subjective and easier to apply, it created too much inequality
among taxpayers.59
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stressed as a major fac-
tor the amount of time the taxpayer spent in the home office. Meiers
spent two-thirds of her working time in the home office, as opposed to
other locations.' The court also considered the importance of the busi-
ness functions conducted at home, the necessity of maintaining an office
in the home, and the expenses incurred by the taxpayer to establish a
home office.6'
Weissman required they practice or write, the home office was necessary for the convenience of the
employer under § 280A(c)(1). This was not brought up because the court's aim was focused on dis-
mantling the focal point test.
W 782 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1986).
56 Id. at 76.
57 Id. at 79.
58 Id.
59 Id.
6D Id. at 75; see Weissman, 751 F.2d at 516; Drucker, 715 F.2d at 69. This is comparative to
the 80% and >50% of time spent in the home office by Weissman and Drucker respectively ld.
6' Meiers, 782 F.2d at 79; see, e.g., Green v. Commissioner, 707 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.
1983).
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IV. THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES TEST USED IN
SOLIMAN
In response to the three appellate court reversals, the Tax Court finally
abandoned the focal point test in Soliman v. Commissioner62 in favor of a
new "facts and circumstances" test.63 Dr. Soliman, an anesthesiologist,
spent thirty to thirty-five hours per week treating or dealing with patients.
He worked out of three hospitals, none of which supplied him with an
office. He used a room in his apartment exclusively as an office. Although
Dr. Soliman did not meet with patients there, he spent two to three hours
per day in the office contacting patients and doctors, maintaining patient
and financial records, performing bookkeeping activities, and reading
books and journals to keep his medical education requirements current."
Applying the focal point test, the only place that qualifies for a deduc-
tion is the place where Dr. Soliman generates his income and performs his
services as an anesthesiologist. Under this criteria, the focal point is the
hospital, not the home office.' The Tax Court, however, broke down
Soliman's occupation into two important functions: 1) to render medical
services at the hospitals and 2) to care for the administrative burdens of
his practice including bookkeeping, billing, preparation for patients and a
continuing medical education.' The majority reasoned that both of these
functions were equally necessary ingredients of a medical practice, only
the second of which required an office.67 According to the court, "where
a taxpayer's occupation requires essential organizational and management
activities that are distinct from those that generate income, the place where
business is managed can be the principal place of business.'"
In deciding which location was the principal place of business for his
administrative activities, the majority balanced the factors.' For instance,
although Dr. Soliman spent more time at the hospitals, the court consid-
94 T.C. 20 (1990), aft'd, 935 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S.Ct. 701 (1993).
63 "If the 'principal place of business' exception has meaning independent of the exception for
home offices used to meet clients or patients, then the 'focal point' test should give way to an analysis
of all the facts and circumstances." Soliman, 94 T.C. at 25 (emphasis added).
64 Id.
65 Id. at 25.
l6 Id. at 26-27.
67 Id.
66 Id. at 25.
69 Id. at 26-29.
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ered the dissimilarity between the hospital and home office activities when
it examined the amount of time spent at each. Weighing the factors, the
majority felt that such a comparison of hours spent in pursuit of each ac-
tivity could be deceptive since both were essential functions of the busi-
ness.
70
Under the circumstances, the court concerned itself only with the fact
that Dr. Soliman spent a substantial amount of time at the home office in
order to conclude that it was the principal place of business.7' The major-
ity grounded its decision on an analogy between Dr. Soliman's situation
and the example of an outside salesman who required only "a substantial
amount of time spent on paperwork at home" to qualify for a deduc-
71tion.
The new "facts and circumstances" test adopted by the court relied on
a number of factors besides the time spent at each location. The court
considered the necessity of the home office, whether those activities per-
formed at the office were essential to manage the business, whether the
office was suited for those essential business functions and needs, and
whether the furniture and equipment were suitable.73 It weighed heavily
the fact that no hospital had made office space available to Dr.
Soliman.74 It further reasoned that the enactment of § 280A was not
meant to, nor should it, force a taxpayer into renting office space rather
than working out of his or her own home.75
The Soliman court considered the factually similar case Pomarantz v.
Commissioner.76 Pomarantz was a physician specializing in emergency
medical care who contracted work to hospitals. He worked about thirty-
five hours per week at the hospital; sixty percent of that time was used to
treat patients. No private office was available to him but he had use of a
work area and lounge. Although he spent about three to five hours per
70 Id. at 26; cf. Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512, 514 (2d Cir. 1984) (where the
professor's activities performed at each office were substantially the same, so it was necessary for the
court to look to the amount of time spent at each in order to determine that a deduction was warranted
for the home office).
71 Soliman, 94 T.C. at 26.
7 Id. at 27; Prop. Income Tax Reg. §l.280A-2(b)(3), 45 Fed. Reg. 52,399 (Aug. 7, 1980) (as
amended, 48 Fed. Reg. 33,320 (July 21, 1983)).
73 Soliman, 94 T.C. at 27-28.
74 Id. But see Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984) (where professor had
office space available to him although it did not provide the privacy or safety he required).
75 Soliman, 94 T.C. at 29.
76 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 599 (1986), aJfd, 867 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1988).
BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
week at a home office in which he kept a library, business records and
patient charts, most weeks he spent more time at the hospital and never
treated patients at his home.
The Ninth Circuit looked to Drucker, Weissman and Meiers to con-
clude that using either the "focal point" test or the "facts and circumstanc-
es" test, the hospital was the principal place of business.77 The Pomarantz
court reasoned that Dr. Pomarantz consistently spent more time in the hos-
pital than at home, his practice was based on treating patients at the hospi-
tal, and his income was generated by the treatment of patients at the hos-
pital, not by the reading or writing done at the home office.78 The ten
percent of working time Dr. Pomarantz spent in the home office was not
considered substantial enough under the Proposed Regulations to warrant a
deduction.79 Without setting any definitive line, the Soliman court distin-
guished Pomarantz by concluding that thirty percent (30%) of a doctor's
time spent in the home office, as was the case for Dr. Soliman, was the
substantial amount necessary to meet the requirement set by the Proposed
Regulations.'0
The court noted, however, that Dr. Soliman could not take advantage
of I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(B) to get the deduction. Although he dealt with
patients on a regular basis over the phone, he did not meet with them at
the home office. The contacts had to include the physical presence of the
patient at the office to get the deduction under § 280A(c)(I)(B).5' This
point of contention becomes more pertinent as the Supreme Court decision
clouds the boundaries between (c)(l)(A) and (c)(1)(B)."2
The dissent written by Judge Ruwe cited Pomarantz and Drucker for
" Pomarantz, 867 F.2d at 497-98; see also Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67, 69 (2d
Cir. 1983) (allowing a deduction as the principal place of business to a musician who spent the most
time performing his most important activity of practicing in his home office); Weissman v. Commis-
sioner, 751 F.2d 512, 514 (2d Cir. 1984) (allowing a deduction to a college professor who accom-
plished the dominant portion of his work at his home office); Meiers v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 75,
79 (7th Cir. 1986) (allowing a deduction to a manager of a laundromat who spent the most time per-
forming the most important business activities in the home office).
78 Pomarantz, 867 F.2d at 497-98.
79 Soliman, 94 T.C. at 27.
so Prop. Income Tax Reg. § 1.280A-2, supra note 54 (allowing a deduction to an outside sales-
person who performs a substantial amount of paperwork at the home office).
81 See I.R.C. §280A(c)(I)(B); Jackson v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 696 (1981) (where no deduc-
tion was granted because the visits were not made on a regular basis); Green v. Commissioner, 78
T.C. 428 (1982) (where physical presence is necessary at the home office, telephone calls do not fulfill
the meeting or dealing requirement of (c)(l)(B)).
82 See Soliman v. Commissioner, 113 S.Ct. 701, 714 (1993); discussion infra part VII.
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the assertion that there could be only one principal place of business for
each enterprise in which a taxpayer is involved. 3 The Supreme Court has
determined that "the words of statutes, including revenue acts, should be
interpreted where possible in their ordinary, everyday senses."' Using its
plain meaning, "principal" is defined as "most important, consequential, or
influential." 5 There is no exception in § 280A referring to "essential" or
"substantial" home office activities." According to those circuits that
have rejected the focal point test, the key for purposes of § 280A is "the
place where the dominant portion of [one's] work [is] accomplished."'
The dissent asserted that the majority failed to make a comparative analy-
sis of the noted factors (i.e., the importance of the home office activities
compared to those at other locations or the amount of time spent at each
location) to determine the specific location where the "dominant portion of
work [was] accomplished." 8 In essence, they argued, the majority adapt-
ed the focal point test to fit the situation where an enterprise may have a
principal place of business for administrative activities as well as one
where goods are delivered and income generated. 9
The dissenters further criticized the majority for apparently overruling
the precedent set down in Drucker of denying the deduction under these
circumstances. Finally, the dissent admonished the majority also for ig-
noring the tests set down by those appellate courts which eroded the focal
point test by stressing the amount of time spent at each location.' They
argued that the majority's reliance on the salesman example set forth in
the Proposed Regulations was erroneous in that a salesman spends most of
his time contacting different customers at a variety of locations, whereas,
Dr. Soliman consistently practiced in only three hospitals, in one of which
he spent the majority of his time.9 Likewise, the Proposed Regulations
93 Soliman, 94 T.C. at 34 (Ruwe, J., dissenting); see Pomarantz v. Commissioner, 867 F.2d
495, 496 (9th Cir. 1988); Drucker v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 605, 612 (2d Cir. 1982).
4 Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571 (1966) (quoting Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6
(1947)).
85 Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1802 (1971).
86 I.R.C. § 280A(c)(I)(A); Soliman, 94 T.C. at 40-41 (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
7 Soliman, 94 T.C. at 34 (Ruwe, J., dissenting); see Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d
512, 514 (2d Cir. 1984); Meiers v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 75, 78-79 (7th Cir. 1986).
U Soliman, 94 T.C. at 35 (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
S Id. at40.
9 Id. at 35; see Drucker v. Commissioner, 715, F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983); Weissman v. Com-
missioner, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984); Meiers v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1986).
91 Soliman, 94 T.C. at 37 (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
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held no value over the appellate courts nor did the Court owe any defer-
ence to them.92
Making a comparative analysis of each factor, the dissenters argued
that the deduction could not pass muster. Although Dr. Soliman's home
office functions were necessary, his business was that of an anesthesiolo-
gist, the performance of which was the most important task in his busi-
ness.93 He spent the dominant portion of his time at the hospitals as an
anesthesiologist.'
Pomarantz was not distinguishable, as asserted by the majority, be-
cause there were certain weeks in which Dr. Pomarantz spent more time
attending to his home office functions rather than patients at the hospi-
tal." Surely, during these weeks the time spent at the home office did not
indicate in any way that Dr. Pomerantz' home office time was insubstan-
tial.
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court's adoption of the facts
and circumstances test allowing deductions so long as the home office was
maintained for "legitimate" purposes, even though the majority of the
taxpayer's time may be spent elsewhere.'
V. SOLIMAN AND THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court has attempted to resolve the question of home
office expense deductions in Soliman.9" The Court flatly rejected the facts
and circumstances test adopted by the Tax Court and Fourth Circuit in
favor of a comparative analysis test similar to that proposed by the Tax
Court dissenters." The Court reasoned that a comparison of the different
locations was necessary to discern which location was the principal place
in terms of business activities." ° Such a comparison of the locations is
required where the plain meaning of principal is defined as "most impor-
2 Soliman, 94 T.C. at 27-28.
93 Soliman, 94 T.C. at 37 (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
9 d
Id. at 40; see Pomarantz v. Commissioner, 867 F.2d 495, 496 (9th Cir. 1988).
Soliman, 94 T.C. at 40 (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
97 Soliman v. Commissioner, 935 F.2d 52, 55 (4th Cir. 1991), affig, 94 T.C. 20 (1990).
8 Commissioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993), rev'g 935 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1991).
'9 ld
'0 Megaard and Megaard, supra note 51 at 135.
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tant, consequential, or influential."'' Thus, there exists only one princi-
pal place of business.
This determination is made by considering two essential elements con-
tained in the facts of each case: 1) the relative importance of the business
activities performed at each location; and, 2) the time spent working at
each location."°  This two-pronged test replaces the three factors con-
tained in the proposed regulations that the lower courts used to establish
the principal place of business test set forth in Weissman and Soliman."3
If the analysis of the two factors produces no principal place of business,
then the courts should not strain to find that the home office qualifies for
the deduction by default."°4
To determine the first prong, courts must evaluate, in a case-by-case
analysis, the different activities performed at the different locations, con-
sidering the essential characteristics of the particular business. 5 This de-
termination should yield a pattern which reveals those activities which are
most important.t The fact that income is generated or clients are met at
a particular location will be afforded great weight as to where the most
important work is performed. This recognition of the formal "focal point,"
however, is not determinative." 7 Likewise, client or patient visits, m or
the "point of delivery" (i.e., where services are rendered or goods are
delivered) are not conclusive, but are significant indicators in many cas-
es. 0
9
A showing of "point of delivery" will not in and of itself entitle the
home office to a principal place designation, but the Court emphasized
that "the place where ... contact occurs is often an important indicator of
the principal place of business," which "is the principal consideration in
most cases.""0 The Court considered the hospitals where Dr. Soliman
met patients and provided anesthesia services to qualify as his "point of
,01 Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 706.
102 Id.
103 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2, supra note 54.
t0, Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 707.
10" Id. at 706.
10 Id.
107 Id.
' Visits qualify for a deduction anyway under § 280A(c)(1)(B), regardless of whether the
home office is designated as the principal place of business. See I.R.C. § 280A (c)(i)(B) (1994).
IN Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 706-07.
1,0 Id. at 707.
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delivery," and thus, more important than his administrative activities per-
formed at home."'
Where no business location's activities appear more important than
those provided at other locations, the Court will look to the second prong
it enunciated: the time spent at each location."' However, in Soliman
the Court did not prioritize the two prongs because Dr. Soliman, by spend-
ing the obvious majority of his time at the hospitals, failed to satisfy either
prong."13
Unlike the Tax Court or the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court refused
to consider the necessity of the home office activities in maintaining the
business or the availability of other office space."4 In the Court's deter-
mination of the principle place of business, the necessity of the activities
is automatically considered within the evaluation of where the most impor-
tant functions are performed. Whether other office space is available is ir-
relevant," 5 unless the taxpayer is an employee maintaining his home of-
fice for the convenience of his employer."'
VI. CRITICISM AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE MAJORITY
DECISION
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joined, offered two solu-
tions in his concurrence. Justice Thomas supported the continued use of
the "focal point" test as an objective and reliable standard in most cases,
also using a subjective test based on the "totality of the circumstances" as
an escape hatch."'
Thomas argued that, for those cases where the "focal point" test fails
to determine a single principal place of business (i.e., where goods and
services are produced and income is generated at multiple locations in-
cluding the home office), the courts should apply the totality of circum-
stances test, guided by the Supreme Court's two factors."' The Court's
emphasis on a taxpayer's point of delivery was basically a restatement of
I Id. at 708.
112 Id. at 707; Megaard and Megaard, supra note 51 at 135.
11 Megaard and Megaard, supra note 51 at 135.
114 Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 707.
115 Id.; Megaard and Megaard, supra note 51 at 135.
116 See I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1) (1994).
117 Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 709 (Thomas, J., concurring).
us Id. at 709-710.
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the focal point test. Supplementing this with an examination of the cir-
cumstances would produce more consistent results."9
Thus, if Soliman spent thirty-five hours at the home office and only
ten hours at the hospital on anesthesiology, and the majority's test would
yield no clear answer. The "focal point" test still determines that the hos-
pitals are the principal places of business."' The advantage in this result
is increased predictability for the taxpayer.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens offered an additional standard which
would provide more consistent results across the board.' He argued that
those self-employed taxpayers who maintained a home office as the head-
quarters of their business, held it out as their principal place of business,
and had no other space available to manage their business should qualify
for a deduction.'
One of the dissent's major concerns was directed at the majority's ap-
parent failure to reconcile the meaning of § 280A with § 162(a), which
would allow a deduction of business expenses if Dr. Soliman's office were
located anywhere else besides his home. Congress adopted § 280A to stop
abuse, not to penalize taxpayers because they did not rent office space or
build a separate structure onto their property." Justice Stevens reasoned
that the statute would be hard to abuse if self-employed taxpayers were
required to satisfy the three conditions already provided for in the tax and
appellate court decisions to qualify for the deduction. These conditions
are: 1) the home office must be used exclusively for business purposes, 2)
it must be used on a regular basis, and 3) one of the three alternative sec-
tions set down in § 280A(c)(1) as a place of business must be satis-
fied.2
Finally, the majority's use of the point of delivery element, which is
satisfied by a meeting with clients, puts more emphasis on §
280A(c)(1)(B) before a home office can be designated a principal place of
business under § 280A(c)(l)(A). This allows the "meeting with clients"
requirement to be a factor in the principal place of business require-
ment. 2 More likely, Congress intended to consider each subsection of §
11 Id. at 709.
1 Id. at 711.
121 Id. at 711 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 714-15.
12 Id. at 711-12.
124 Id. at 713; I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1) (1994).
' Soliman, 113 S. Ct. at 714 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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280A separately as to when a taxpayer can qualify for a deduction, so that
she may deduct expenses at a location where she does not necessarily
meet with clients or maintain an office for the convenience of his employ-
er.'26 Thus, Soliman takes the bite out of § 280A(c)(l)(A) in many in-
stances where § 280A(c)(1)(B) is not satisfied.'2 '
The implications of the decision may cause more confusion over the
deductibility of home office expenses. The Court's standard requires a
case-by-case analysis of the factual elements, which may produce inconsis-
tent results.'28 By not specifying how courts should apply the two com-
parative factors or which factor should be applied first, there is no guid-
ance for courts to follow as to which should be afforded more weight.
Another problem exists in comparing those business locations where the
most time is spent at the home office, yet the income is generated else-
where.'29
The Court offers no solution had Dr. Soliman spent more time at his
home office than any of the three hospitals individually or combined, as
was the case in Drucker and Weissman. These cases allowed deductions,
prior to Soliman, using factors similar to those used in Soliman to disallow
the deduction. 3° By applying the "relative importance" factor first, simi-
lar to Soliman, it would appear that musicians and teachers could not
deduct the use of a home office. 3' Nor is there any clarity to the Court's
ruling if, as in the case of a general contractor, the taxpayer spends the
most amount of time and generates income outside of the home office




In Id. at 706.
129 Id. at 709; Megaard and Megaard, supra note 51 at 136.




VH. THE REGULATORY RESPONSE TO SOLIMAN
The I.R.S. has modified proposed regulation § 1.280A-2(b)(3) in re-
sponse to Soliman 33 To determine the principal place of business, the
I.R.S. will use the "relative importance of the activities performed at each
location" and the "time spent at each location" factors set forth in Soliman
to replace the three factors used by the lower courts."3 Following the
structure set forth by Supreme Court, the "relative importance" factor will
be applied first. If this yields no definitive principal place of business then
"the time spent at each location" factor will be applied. 35 It is possible
that after both are applied, the tests may yield no determination at all.
Further, the I.R.S. has replaced the outside salesperson example with sev-
en new situations to illustrate how it will apply the Soliman factors to de-
termine the principal place of business.36 They are as follows:
Example 1. An anesthesiologist regularly and exclusively uses her
home office to contact patients, surgeons, and hospitals by telephone; to
maintain billing records and patient logs; to prepare for treatments and
presentations; to satisfy continuing medical education requirements; and to
read medical journals and books. She spends approximately ten to fifteen
hours a week in her home office and thirty to thirty-five hours per week
administering anesthesia and care in three hospitals, none of which provid-
ed her with an office.'37
The essence of her business is to treat patients in hospitals. The home
office activities are less important than the services performed in the hos-
pitals. Further, the comparison of the ten to fifteen hours at home versus
the thirty to thirty-five hours spent at the hospitals supports the conclusion
that her home office is not her principal place of business. Therefore, she
cannot deduct expenses for the business use of her home.'
Example 2. A salesperson, whose only office is in his house, uses it
regularly and exclusively to set up appointments, store product samples,
13 See Rev. Rul. 94-24, 1994-15 I.R.B. 5; Rev. Proc. 93-12, 1993-8 I.R.B. 46.
The I.R.S. has also modified Publication 587, "Business Use Of Your Home," which reflects
Soliman. This will provide taxpayers with the notice and opportunity to comply with Soliman's man-
dates.
134 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2, supra note 54.
'35 Rev. Rul. 94-24, 1994-15 I.R.B. 5.
136 Rev. Rul. 94-24, 1994 15 I.R.B. 5; Rev. Proc. 93-12, 1993-8 I.R.B. 46.
'37 Rev. Proc. 93-12, 1993-8 I.R.B. 46.
'39 Id.
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and write orders and other reports for the companies whose products he
sells, also cannot deduct expenses for the business use of his home.'
His business is selling products to customers at various locations. He
regularly visits the customers to explain the available products and to take
orders. He makes only a few sales from his home office and spends about
thirty hours a week visiting customers and twelve hours a week working
at his home office."
His essential business function is to meet with customers at their place
of business. The home office activities are less important than the sales
activities he performs when visiting customers. Further, the comparison of
twelve hours versus thirty hours per week spent visiting customers sup-
ports the conclusion that his home office is not his principal place of busi-
ness. Therefore, he cannot deduct expenses for the business use of his
home. '
Example 3. A salesperson performs the same activities in his home
office as in Example 2, except that he now makes most of his sales to
customers by telephone or mail from his home office. He spends an aver-
age of thirty hours a week at his home office and twelve hours a week
visiting customers to deliver products and occasionally takes orders.
His essential business function is to make telephone or mail contact
with customers, primarily from his home office. Actually visiting custom-
ers is less important to the business than the sales activities performed
from his home office. Further, a comparison of thirty hours versus twelve
hours supports the conclusion that the home office is his principal place of
business. Therefore, he can deduct expenses for the business use of his
home.42
Example 4. A self-employed plumber installs and repairs plumbing in
customers' homes and offices. The plumber spends about forty hours a
week at customer locations and ten hours a week in his home office talk-
ing with customers on the telephone, deciding what supplies to order, and
reviewing the business books. He also employs an individual full-time in
the office to perform administrative services."'





13 Rev. Rul. 94-24, 1994-15 I.R.B. 5.
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es and deliver goods at his customers' locations. The activities that he per-
forms at the home office, although essential, are less important and take
less time than the service calls to the customers.'" The fact that the
plumber's employee performs administrative activities at the home office
doesn't alter the result. Therefore, the plumber's home office is not his
principal place of business, and he cannot deduct expenses for the business
use of the home.
Example 5. A school teacher maintains a home office for use in class
preparation and for grading papers and tests. She also has a small shared
office at the school. The teacher spends about twenty-five hours a week at
the school and thirty to thirty-five hours of work time a week in the home
office. 45
The activities performed in the home office, although essential and
more time consuming, are less important than the teacher's activities at the
school." Because the home office is not the teacher's principal place of
business, it's not necessary to determine whether she maintains the office
for the convenience of her employer. Again, the I.R.S. concludes that the
home office is not the principal place of business.
Example 6. An author spends from thirty to thirty-five hours a week
writing in her home office. She also spends another ten to fifteen hours a
week at other locations conducting research, meeting with her publishers,
and attending promotional events.'47
The essence of the author's business is writing and the outside activi-
ties, although essential, are less important and take less time than the writ-
ing. In this case, the home office is the author's principal place of busi-
ness, and she can deduct expenses for the business use of the home.'48
Example 7. A self-employed retailer orders costume jewelry from
wholesalers and sells it at craft shows, on consignment, and through mail
orders. He spends about twenty-five hours a week in his home office fill-
ing and shipping mail orders, ordering supplies, and keeping the books of
the business. The retailer also spends about fifteen hours a week at craft







of income from each type of sales activity. 49
Because the most important activities of the business - sales to cus-
tomers - are performed in more than one location, the principal place of
business can't be determined definitively based on a comparison of the
relative importance of the activities performed at the home office or at
other business locations. Therefore, the time spent "at each business loca-
tion assumes particular significance."' 50 Applying the time test, the
retailer's home office is his principal place of business.
These scenarios, using the Court's comparative analysis test, may still
result in different outcomes for similarly situated taxpayers. There may be
confusion when a situation arises as a hybrid of two or more examples.
For instance, the tax question faced by Professor Weissman... addresses
different activities that separately arise in both example five and six. Be-
cause the examples result in opposing determinations, the deductibility of
his home office remains unclear.
Weissman spent eighty percent of his time researching and writing, as
required by the terms of his employment, at his home office. According to
example six, he could take a deduction. He was employed as a professor
to teach, however, and he was provided with an office, albeit one unsuit-
able to his needs. Under Soliman there can be only one principal place of
business regardless how many different functions are necessary to the
business. Applying the relative importance factor, the activities performed
at the college and home office are quite different, yet both appear to be
essential under the terms of employment.
If this is the case, then the home office must be considered as the
principal place of business by applying the time spent test. However, if
Professor Weissman was employed to teach first and foremost, then the
Service might consider teaching to be the essential activity of his business.
The examples at least provide taxpayers with more information with which
to work and should enable them to determine the I.R.S.'s position on the
deductibility of their home offices with more consistency.
In a recent case following Soliman, the Tax Court in Crawford v.
Commissioner52 disallowed a deduction to a doctor who sometimes met
patients at his home office when follow-up service was required. The Tax
149 Id.
o Id.
"' See Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984).
132 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2540 (1993).
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Court, using Soliman as its guide, noted that although Dr. Crawford spent
thirty-five percent of his time at the home office and, unlike Soliman,
sometimes treated patients there, the follow-up work was considered an
extension of the hospital treatment.' The taxpayer must regularly meet
with patients at the home office or the court will find that the home office
is not the principal place of business."
Dr. Crawford would still be ineligible for the deduction even if either
Justice Thomas' test or Justice Stevens' test as described in Soliman were
applied. Using the "focal point" test as recommended by Justice Thom-
as,155 no deduction would be allowed because the hospital, and not
Crawford's home, is considered his principal place of business. The hospi-
tal is where he derived all of his income and rendered the majority of his
services."' Likewise, the court would deny the deduction under the
Stevens test'57 because the hospitals made space available to Dr.
Crawford to do follow-up work.' Further, he did not hold out the home
office as his principal place of business.'
This places a heavy burden on the taxpayer to prove the regularity of
patient visits to the home office. It is fitting that the burden of proof, to
show the exclusive and regular use of the home office for business pur-
poses, be placed upon the taxpayer who is taking the deduction."' This
heavy burden will ensure that deductions will only be taken for legitimate
133 Id. at 2541-42. The follow-up work was part of the service required by the hospitals under
their contract, and Dr. Crawford received no extra payments for work performed at his home office.
15 Id. at 2544-45. The court ruled that it could not determine that the home office was the
principal place of business because the record did not show that the work done at the home office was
more important than that done at the hospital. Further, § 280A(c)(1)(B) was not met because the re-
cord did not demonstrate the regularity of the visits nor how much follow-up work was actually done
at the home office.
155 Justice Thomas defines a taxpayers focal point of business as "the single location where the
taxpayer's business income is generated." Soliman, 113 S.Ct at 709 (Thomas, J., concurring).
156 Id.
157 Justice Stevens focuses on an appropriate and helpful standard where the expenses incurred
in maintaining a home office by an employee are a condition of employment and regularly used for
the performance of the employees duties. Id. at 713 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
M5 Crawford, 65 T.C.M. at 2542.
13% Id. at 2545.
16 Id. (ruling no deduction where the record does not show the amount of time spent at home
conducting follow-up work). See also Coutsoubelis v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 934 (1993).
The court ruled that the taxpayer's most important work as a painter was done at the gas stations
where he painted and not at home preparing bids and contacting workers and customers by telephone.
Further, the taxpayer did not establish the amount of time spent at the home office, so the court denied
the deduction.
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home offices, preventing the abuses that have concerned Congress.
Two legislative bills have been introduced in reaction to Soliman in an
attempt to redefine the meaning of principal place of business under §
280A(c)(1). Senators Hatch and Burns have each sponsored legislation to
amend § 280A(c)(1).
The Hatch bill 6' attempts to clarify the deductibility of the home of-
fice. It amends subsection (c) to include a home office as the principal
place of business if: 1) the office is the location where the taxpayer's es-
sential administrative or management activities are conducted on a regular
and systematic (and not incidental) basis by the taxpayer, and 2) the office
is necessary because the taxpayer has no other location for the perfor-
mance of the administrative or management activities of the business.62
The reasoning behind the Hatch bill is that Soliman penalizes small
business owners who find it more economical to work out of their homes
than paying rent somewhere else. The Senator argues that Soliman requires
business owners to physically meet clients or customers at the home office
and that the revenue of the business must actually be earned in the home
office.'63 This argument is- representative of the fact that the Supreme
Court, although it has abandoned the focal point test in favor of a compar-
ative analysis, has not clarified the confusion over which factors the tax-
payer must meet to get the deduction. It depicts how the Court has al-
lowed the § 280A(c)(1)(B) meeting requiremelt to determine the principal
place of business, thus over-shadowing § 280A(c)(1)(A)'s purpose. T he
Hatch bill favors the Tax Court's "facts and circumstances" assessment of
Soliman by breaking a business into two distinct functions. The bill takes
a very pro-taxpayer slant because the only factor to consider is the avail-
ability of another location for administrative activities. It may open the
door for the abuse which § 280A was enacted to prevent.
The bill also begs the question of what makes another location avail-
able.'" The Hatch bill only addresses administrative and management
activities performed at the home office. It does not establish what factors
to consider if such activities are not managerial as in Weissman and
161 S. 1924, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994).
162 Id.
163 140 Cong. Rec. S2810-11 (daily ed. March 10, 1994) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
16 Cf. Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that although the col-
lege provided Professor Weissman with an office, its lack of safety and privacy made it practically
unavailable for his specific needs).
COMMISSIONER V. SOLIMAN
Drucker."6 It is unclear whether Soliman still controls in these situations.
Senator Burns' bill" cites four new factors that would allow a tax-
payer to take a deduction. Under the Burns bill, a home office, used ex-
clusively and on a regular basis, is the principal place of business if: 1)
management or administrative activities are essential to the trade or busi-
ness of the taxpayer, 2) the only available office for such activities is in
the dwelling unit of the taxpayer, 3) such office is essential to such trade
or business, and 4) the taxpayer spends a substantial amount of time in the
office. 167
Like the Hatch bill, the Burns bill champions the Tax Court's deci-
sion. It follows the original salesman example in the proposed regulations
by additionally requiring that a substantial amount of time be spent in the
home office. This additional requirement, however, probably will not alle-
viate confusion because the courts will still be responsible for deciding
what amounts to a "substantial amount of time," and the courts have yet
to set a definitive line for taxpayers to follow.s
Such laws are significant as they shift the presumption of a deduction
to the taxpayer. It is clear that more taxpayers would qualify for home
office deductions, but neither bill does much to lift the confusion that the
Supreme Court allegedly resolved in Soliman.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A taxpayer can spend the significant portion of business hours, interact
with clients and perform the most important business tasks at the home
office, thereby qualifying for a home office deduction pursuant to §
280A(c)(l)(B). Determination of qualification for a home office deduc-
tion, however, is applied on a case-by-case basis, and therefore, does not
provide a taxpayer with a "bright line" rule to follow.
As such, the Thomas test provides an equitable solution or alternative
165 In Drucker, the court held that the musicians' "principal place[s] of business" were their
home practice studios, and that the rent, electricity and maintenance costs allocated to these practice
areas were deductible. Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1983).
166 S. 1116, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
167 Id.
166 Compare Soliman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 20 (1990), aff'd 935 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1991)
(holding that thirty percent of working time spent in the home office is substantial) with Pomarantz v.
Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 599 (1986), aff'd 867 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that ten per-
cent of working time spent in the home office was not substantial).
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when it is difficult to determine the principal place of business under the
focal point test. The focal point test, despite its inequities, is easier to ap-
ply than other tests, and it provides the predictability desired in tax plan-
ning.
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